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The Valuation Bottom of 2009: Rehashing the "Once in a lifetime buying opportunity" argument

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March 02, 2011 – Comments (15)

This is a complex subject and there are many ways to look at it. I think this continues to be a point of discussion (deservedly so) because it really will set up investor expectations, real returns, how we expect this secular bear to play out ... etc.

So here are some points I want to make up front before diving into my spiel:

1) I am NOT expecting any kind of agreement here from anybody

In fact I am expecting more than a small number of rebuttals. I am thinking of checklist34 in particular :). And you know what, THAT'S OKAY! There are many ways to look at this complex subject. And reasonable people with differing opinions can come to legitimately different conclusions. We are all here to discuss, debate and learn.

My only request is that any discussion stays on point and civil

2) My purpose in writing this is NOT to convince anybody of anything

I have looked at this issue and thought about it ever since March 2009, as likely has anybody who will read this. I have an opinion and a viewpoint and I am sharing it. That's it. Whether you read it and say "I agree", or "That's complete BS", or even "Rehashing. So where's the pot?" is immaterial to me. I am expressing a viewpoint. Nothing more, nothing less.

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So what are we talking about? This chart (or one of a million that are similar):



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Does this chart represent a meaningful PE bottom? Well, the answer looks like 'no', but others would argue (and so do I) that looking at the PE chart of the S&P 500 in simply nominal terms does not tell the whole story.

I have provided two variants on the above chart over a year ago that I have updated periodically. It is based on Professor Shiller's data. Please see this post: Macro Thoughts and Observations. Is the Bear Market Dead? Is this the Start of a new Secular Bull Market?

The data is  from Professor Shiller's data.

P/E and Dividend History in Nominal Terms:



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P/E and Dividend History in Real Terms using Professor Shiller's Cyclically Adjusted PE (Real P/E measured by rolling 10 year earnings):



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My argument in that the second chart is the far more useful of the two. Using Professor Shiller's CAPE shows that the pullback in valuations was much more severe than simply looking at it in nominal terms. And I think this is more accurate.

But the observation remains that even using CAPE, the valuation bottom in 2009 basically took the PE from highly overvalued to average values. There was no undershoot to single digits (a P/E of 5-7).

Mean reversion is a very powerful thing. Market forces rarely go from overvalued to fairly valued and then resume the march upward. There is almost always some time spent in undervalued territory. (I will discuss this a bit more later).

I keep talking about Dividends and the P/E ratio, and you can read why I do so on the chart. Here is a quick blurb why:

I do think that corporations are healthier now than they were 2 years ago. And I expect them to be relatively healthy during the next cyclical bear market (the one that I believe will end this secular bear) sometime in the next 5-8 years. The difference will be that P/E's will compress. They will go to single digits, just like they have done in every single secular bear market that we have records for.

That will be when we find the real values. Not here with the SPX over 1300. The 2009-20xx bull market's purpose was to get rid of much of the unhealthiness that got trashed from 2007-2009. Corporations are by and large doing much better, and the next cyclical bear will be about margin and P/E compression. There will be a lot of babies thrown out with the bathwater.

In the same vein, because corporations will largely be healthy during the next cyclical bear, I expect many of them to use their balance sheets to pay out dividends in higher rates than we have seen in the last many years. The markets will be crushing stock prices, and to return shareholder value the companies will increase payouts. In fact I expect very good yields before this secular bear is done.


Now there is an opposing viewpoint to this, and checklist34 has expressed it here: Dividends -vs- share buybacks: opinions and questions I have. Basically it is that dividends have ceased to be the vehicle of choice to return value to the shareholder, and that over the past 20 years buybacks have been replacing dividends.

I think this is a true statement. But I also think it does not tell the whole story, nor do I think this refutes my thesis. And it all boils down to: "What is the most efficient way for a company to return value to the shareholders?". Is it retaining cash for investment to drive earnings growth or for buybacks? Or is it though dividends?

There are some valid rebuttals to the cutting dividends / retaining cash argument found here. Here are a few excerpts.

Higher  retained earnings (lower dividend payouts) does NOT equal higher  earnings growth. Merrill’s logic assumes that companies can infinitely  reinvest earnings into their business at a given ROE without degrading  it, when the experience of companies in the real world says otherwise.  That is why good companies return cash to shareholders, because they  know that at some level of retained earnings (different for each  company), the reinvestment opportunities are limited without accepting  lower returns. Research by Cliff Asness and Rob Arnott (Surprise! Higher Dividends  = Higher Earnings Growth) proves  this empirically (the charts below are theirs). Real world experience  as an investor has taught me that companies that pay higher dividends  actually have HIGHER earnings growth, precisely BECAUSE of the  discipline it forces on executives regarding what they do with earnings.



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I think these are exceptionally good observations. I think dividend payouts do force an extra level of responsibility on a company's management. And I think the last 20 years has been marked by corporate irresponsibility and excessive risk taking. I think responsibility will be a lesson that is relearned before the end of this secular bear by corporate America in general. I stand by the theory that I state above the dividend payouts will increase before this secular bear is done.

In short, I think the P/E ratio (again I would recommend CAPE, not simply nominal P/E) approaching the Dividend Yield metric for a secular bear market signals is still useful and will be proven to be right.

Earnings and The Business Cycle

There are more ways to look at the P/E ratio for a utility standpoint. And the most useful is the 'expected rolling 10 year returns'. This is a useful exercise but does not lead to an unambiguous conclusion.

John Hussman keeps track of this and updates it periodically in his WMC. But the best source that contains P/E and 10 year returns is from Crestmont Research which I pointed out in: Macro Thoughts and Observations. Is the Bear Market Dead? Is this the Start of a new Secular Bull Market?

There are periods in market history where earnings expand and act like a spur to the stock market. However, there are also periods in market history where earnings can expand and the market goes nowhere. Earnings expansion *does not necessarily* drive stock prices higher. I would argue they usually do. But this is why a market driven by increasing earnings without a commensurate increase in revenue and without stable fundamental macroeconomic underpinnings is a dangerous trend to extrapolate upon. Especially if said market is 'goosed' by excessive liquidity (like ours is right now). Consider this a cautionary point.

Beyond that however, it is likely that we have seen our peak earnings growth rates and are now on a declining trend of growth rate (first slowing, then negative) as suggested by the business cycle.

While the intermediate term outlook for stocks is, in my opinion, good (but risky), the long term outlooks (10 years) is nowhere near as secure.

I offer these two exhibits from Crestmont Research

i) Rolling 10-year returns based on starting P/E - http://www.crestmontresearch.com/pdfs/Stock%20Gazing%20Future.pdf



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ii) The business cycle and EPS growth rates - http://www.crestmontresearch.com/pdfs/Stock%20PE%20Report.pdf



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Both of these suggest that the 10-year growth rate for money invested here has a low expected annual rate of return. Further I would say that volatility within this period will also be extremely high and investors will have to suffer through either a crash, or perhaps a few mini-crashes.


There is another very useful Crestmont Research chart from REVISITING THE SHILLER P/E

Come again? Actual EPS through the cycle  drives “most” of market performance? Where has Bianco been the last 20  years? Earnings over long periods of time do not drive market  performance, changes in VALUATION MULTIPLES drive market performance  (with the 1930s Great Depression being a possible exception) Ed  Easterling at Crestmont Research breaks down long-term stock market return components.



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So what is the upshot? There are some mixed takeaways.

At first glance this seems to support the idea that 2009 was a valuation bottom. The P/E10 in 1999-2000 was 45 and the ten year avg. compounded return (2009-2010) was -3%. This is similar in setup to the 1929 peak and Great Depression move. So here we are at 2009, and the charts say that our 10 year avg. compounded rate of return will be between 10 and 15% based on previous historical data points. This would add some credence to idea that 2009 was a once in a lifetime buying opportunity.

However, the length of the PE (again, not nominal P/E but 10 year rolling PE's) so far above the avg historical PE is literally without precedent for flagship US stock market indices. Does that necessarily mean anything? ... not necessarily :). But it is a point worth making.

Forget P/E's

Okay, so there are ways to talk about PE's that either substantiate the long term bullish case from March 2009, or to say that March 2009 was just a stop on the way to a true secular low. The data above (and other P/E data and analysis) can be interpreted in either way.

So are there other valuation metrics that are perhaps not as ambiguous as P/E that might help us?

Yes!

Tobin's Q (or the Q ratio) does just that. Doug Short does a fantastic job of keeping that metric updated here: http://dshort.com/articles/Q-Ratio-and-market-valuation.html

The Q Ratio is a popular method of estimating the fair value of the stock market developed by Nobel Laureate James Tobin. It's a fairly simple concept, but laborious to calculate. The Q Ratio is the total price of the market divided by the replacement cost of all its companies. Fortunately, the government does the work of accumulating the for the calculation. The numbers are supplied in the Federal Reserve Z.1 Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, which is released quarterly.



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So, even from a replacement cost perspective, the stock market never mean reverted in 2009. It went down to the long term average and bounced off. There was no undershoot. In fact, this behavior is quite similar to Professor Shiller's CAPE.

The Takeaway

Again, please read points #1 and #2 at the very top of the post.

Did the market mark a once in a lifetime buying opportunity in March 2009? My answer is (surprisingly)... yes. [with a number of large caveats].

I think anyone who was greedy while others were fearful and bought in March 2009 for the long haul will do exceptionally well. A distinction must first be made against 'companies' and 'the stock market'.

As checklist will likely point out, "[I]t was a once-ever event where a cascading series of things resulted in losses being uniquely high for a relatively brief series of time.  These factors include: 1.  mark to market accounting which overstated losses at many kinds of financials considerably 2.  the fantastical swing in commodity prices which whiplashed several industries and left them briefly bleeding cash 3.  a huge wave of goodwill write-downs and other one-time charges.  many companies had to write down all good will, resulting in monstrous losses, essentialy all of which were concentrated in q4 08 and q1 09.  4.  the enormous rash of layoffs was accompanied by associated costs" (which was a response on one of my posts).

And you know what, I don't disagree. I think 2009 will likely market the bottom for a number of companies. So in part, I definitely agree with his argument.

However, do I think the stock market as a whole bottomed in 2009? Or stated differently:

Is there a chance that the stock market as a whole can make a lower low before the end of this secular bear?

My answer is 'yes'.

I think there are a number of valuation metrics (some independent of earnings) that show that a bottom was not reached in terms of the historical bottoming range.

Another big impact on the business cycle are margins. We are currently near a profit margin highs and ever since 2000 we have been on the upper end of the profit margin spectrum

The main engine for earnings has been profit margin expansion for Corporate America's balance sheets. It is not revenue growth being driven by an increase in real final sales (which is what we want to see in a recovery). This is a tactic of limited life because margins can only increase for so long. Labor costs, productivity gains, input costs reach a low and margins mean-revert. In short, Profit Margins for the market tend to run in cycles and we are near the top of ours.

Consider this post from Henry Blodget (see: http://www.businessinsider.com/stocks-profit-margins-2010-11)

But unless "it's different this time" (the four most expensive words in the English language), stock returns over the next decade are likely to be far worse than average.

Why?

Valuation.

Stocks appear reasonably valued when viewed against today's super-high profit margins. But in the past, every time profit margins have gotten so high (and they've only gotten this high once before), profit margins have reverted to the mean, taking stocks down with them.

Here's a chart from Northern Trust's Paul Kasriel. It shows corporate after-tax profit margins as a percent of GDP (with inventory adjustments) for the past half-century.




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Note that only 5 times in the past 60 years have corporate profit margins approached the levels they're at today. And note what happened each time thereafter. (They regressed to--or beyond--the mean.)

When corporate profit margins are expanding, profits grow faster than revenue, and stock multiples usually expand (stocks track profits over the long haul).

When corporate profit margins are shrinking, profits grow more slowly than revenue, and stock multiples usually contract.

The most optimistic forecasts for real GDP for the next several years (a proxy for corporate revenue) call for growth of 3%-4% per year.*

If profit margins stay at today's high levels, this would mean earnings growth of about 4%-6% per year, which is below normal.*

If profit margins begin to revert to the mean, meanwhile, profit growth will be even slower.


What I think this will mean is that before this secular bear is done, both earnings and profit margins will compress.

- Like I said above, companies are much healthier today than they have been in the past decade
- Balance sheets are much cleaner and for some companies and sectors are in spectacular shape
- So whereas 2007-2009 showed how fragile corporate America was, I don't think that will be the case with the final cyclical bear to close out the secular bear
- However both the effects of earnings compression and margin compression will be a double whammy that affects the entire market
- Some companies will still be doing well, but their stock will be going nowhere / down based on these business cycle headwinds. This is one of the main reasons why I think there will be a trend of growing dividends to return value to shareholders.
- However, there are still some industries that are fragile and will not weather another cyclical bear market well (I am thinking mostly of financials and consumer discretionary). I also think the weaker companies within any given sector will be in danger as margins compress across the board
- Strong companies in sectors will be using the next cyclical bull to find bargins

So in 2009, profit margins were still at around 6% (currently back up to 8%) and 10 year rolling EPS (in real terms) for the S&P 500 was around $58 => a P/E10 at the bottom of around 12

I think in 2020-ish (who knows, but I think the secular bear has about 7-10 more years before it ends based on previous secular bears), profit margins will be much lower, say around 3-4% and a 10 year rolling EPS of something like $80 is my guess. Assuming a more historical bottoming P/E10 of around 7 => S&P 500 market bottom around 550-600.

I actually don't think it will be substantially lower than the 2009 bottom. I don't think the Dow goes to triple digits.

But when I look at historical trends surrounding secular bear market bottoms, these are the types of numbers that I come up with.

Conclusion

As I said in points #1 and #2, I am not trying to convince anybody of anything. This analysis is hopefully a reasonable (and not hyperbole-filled) explanation of the bearish case, at least how I see it. It is meant to provoke thought and discussion.

It is not meant to provoke an argument. Please feel free to discuss and debate below, as long as it is done civilly.

15 Comments – Post Your Own

#1) On March 02, 2011 at 6:37 PM, Option1307 (30.03) wrote:

Fantastic thought provoking post Binve, great stuff as always.

I think in 2020-ish (who knows, but I think the secular bear has about 7-10 more years before it ends based on previous secular bears)

What's funny is that even though you and checklist disagree in certain areas, both of you are think we are still in the midst of a secular bear. See, you two aren't so different afterall!

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#2) On March 02, 2011 at 6:48 PM, whereaminow (< 20) wrote:

I concur. Thought provoking indeed. Made me realize how little I understand :(

David in Qatar

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#3) On March 02, 2011 at 10:18 PM, gman444 (28.92) wrote:

Fine, fine work, Binve, and very coherent conclusions.  In terms of stockpicking, this seems to fit with my current approach of picking dividend producing companies from industries  which produce basic and essential goods/services.  Thanks for the contribution. 

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#4) On March 02, 2011 at 10:28 PM, rexlove (99.56) wrote:

Interesting as always. A lot of statistics here...

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#5) On March 02, 2011 at 11:02 PM, binve (< 20) wrote:

Option1307,

Thanks! I appreciate that!

Yeah, checklist and I agree on quite a few things (we also disagree on plenty as well). But he is pretty adamant that we will not break the 2009 low, and I differ from that stance.

whereaminow ,

Thanks man!

gman444 ,

Thanks gman. Yeah, no matter what this secular bear ends up doing (new low, no new low, what have you) I think quality dividend payers are tough to beat.

rexlove,

Thanks. Yeah, I wanted to stick to stats and analysis and try to tone down rhetoric as much as possible

 

--------------AMENDMENT------------------------------

I state above near the end of the post:

I think in 2020-ish (who knows, but I think the secular bear has about 7-10 more years before it ends based on previous secular bears), profit margins will be much lower, say around 3-4% and a 10 year rolling EPS of something like $80 is my guess. Assuming a more historical bottoming P/E10 of around 7 => S&P 500 market bottom around 550-600.

I just wanted to back up my $80 EPS number, so you don't think I pulled it from my a$$. Here is a real (inflation adjusted) earnings chart that I have produced in the past. Again from Professor Shiller's data (just like the CAPE).

The exponential trendline reaches $55 in 2020. However, like I point out above, corporate balance sheets really got cleaned up during the crisis (by and large, this is obviously not true across the board). So I tend to think that earning will be at or above trend for the next 10 years. So I think $80 as a rolling 10 year earnings estimate for 2020 is not a bad or unreasonable guess

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-PUEqNjxeeUo/TW8P3ZiK0BI/AAAAAAAADrU/a_NZpJhDcpg/s1600/binve-Real-Earnings-1870-2010.png..

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#6) On March 03, 2011 at 12:58 AM, awallejr (79.53) wrote:

That last graph is the most telling.  What you see is an upward slanting line over a 100 years with the current S&P not that far off it.  I will say that you do put your heart and soul into your blogs Binve and for that I will always rec you; tho recing and agreeing are two different things heheh.

I see value in short term TA since tracking short term investing  trends can have value.  But long term it is still and always will be apples to oranges.  The Dow in 1920 is completely different to the DOW today, as with the S&P. To try to interpolate is pointless.  Yesterday and today are two different worlds.

But what you do see is an ever increasing line as shown in that last graph.  And I submit that is inflation more than anything. 

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#7) On March 03, 2011 at 8:44 AM, binve (< 20) wrote:

awallejr,

>>I will say that you do put your heart and soul into your blogs Binve and for that I will always rec you;

Thanks man.

>> tho recing and agreeing are two different things heheh.

No worries :) Like I said in points #1 and #2, I am not expecting nor am I looking for agreement.

>>I see value in short term TA since tracking short term investing  trends can have value.  But long term it is still and always will be apples to oranges.  The Dow in 1920 is completely different to the DOW today, as with the S&P. To try to interpolate is pointless.  Yesterday and today are two different worlds.

That is your opinion and it is different from mine, and I respect that. But I disagree. TA at its very core is a study of momentum and trends and these have root in greed and fear (human emotions). I think the forces that drive the market then vs. today are similar. That is of course my opinion :)

But what you do see is an ever increasing line as shown in that last graph.  And I submit that is inflation more than anything.

??? The last graph is the real (inflation-adjusted) earnings for the S&P 500 and it is clearly labeled as such. This means after accounting for inflation, there is still growth in real earnings for the S&P 500. For a given period of time the year over year change might be negative. But the long term growth trend (after accounting for inflation) is positive..

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#8) On March 03, 2011 at 1:35 PM, swank9 (< 20) wrote:

pretty awesome stuff binve, as per usual.  thanks for sharing!

 hope all is well buddy

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#9) On March 03, 2011 at 1:42 PM, awallejr (79.53) wrote:

And I submit that is inflation more than anything. 

My bad, I meant to say expansion, not inflation.  And to be more specific, expansion of the overall economy.  Certainly the overall economy of the US today would dwarf that of the overall economy of the US in 1880.

And as you say here:  "I think the forces that drive the market then vs. today are similar. That is of course my opinion :)" that is where we will always disagree ;)  The world back in say 1880 is just so completely different than today.   

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#10) On March 03, 2011 at 2:13 PM, binve (< 20) wrote:

swank9 ,

Thanks swank! Things are good man, thanks for asking. Hope you are doing well also!

awallejr,

>>My bad, I meant to say expansion, not inflation.

gotcha

>>that is where we will always disagree ;)  The world back in say 1880 is just so completely different than today.  

fair enough :)..

 

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#11) On March 09, 2011 at 3:48 AM, checklist34 (99.71) wrote:

i will be on this tomorrow, and do my best to demonstrably demonstrate the EXTREME value that existed in the first week of march, 2009

(and also around Nov 20, 2008, which was, in many ways, the real bottom.  It was mroe or less JUST indebted companies and financials that bottomed in March 09, Nov 20 saw the bottom for "healthy" companies galore).

The depth of the selloff has been consistently, and grossly, underestimated by all, all along.  

I shall pontificate tomorrow.

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#12) On March 09, 2011 at 4:53 AM, binve (< 20) wrote:

checklist34 ,

Hey man

>>i will be on this tomorrow, and do my best to demonstrably demonstrate the EXTREME value that existed in the first week of march, 2009

I don't doubt you one bit. In fact, if you read above at the beginning of The Takeaway section I reference some of your previous arguments that you have made. And like I mention above, I do agree with your argument. 

Furtther, any post that you write talking about the extreme value will most likely find agreement from me.

I completely admit that I overlooked the extreme value argument at the time. In retrospect, that was a bad call.

But let me state why I think we could still make a lower low despite that.

1. We had extreme valuations against cash flow and book value and earnings at the very depth of the crisis (March 2009), no argument from me.
2. However, 10 year rolling PEs only reached about 11 at the bottom. There was a spike lower, but there was never any signicant duration spent in an oversold stock market wide valuation (this is confirmed by the Tobins Q)
3. Balance sheets across the board are much stronger
4. Profit margins are still very high. They were high before the crisis. They were only 'average' (not historically low) in 2008/2009
5. Earnings from here on out are likely to improve. Seriously. See my thoughts above in comment #5
6. 10 year rolling real (inflation adjusted) earning for the S&P in 2008/2009 were about $50. I think by the end of the secular bear, they will be $70-$80. I am reiterating this, I think corporate balance sheets are in much better shape and earnings will grow from here on out in comparison to the 2009 bottom. I am 100% agreeing with you value arguments at the bottom
7. But we are still at the high end of both a profit margin and earnings expansion cycle.
8. The next 10 years will likely see (this is my theory) a move toward lower profit margins => lower earnings multiples. This goes back to your flopflation argument. We will continue to see commodity price spikes and these will tried to be passed along to consumers. This will not take hold as consumers are still deleveraging and wage growth is stagnant. Both of these forces will squeeze produces during price spike periods therby reducing profit margins. The cycle wants to head lower and I think this is the mechanism by which it does
9. Lower profit margins => lower earnings multiples will combine to put downward pressure on prices.
10. So whereas 2009 saw very fragile balance sheets, I think companies at the 2020-ish? bottom will be much more robust. This will be the difference between 1975 and 1982 (and 1982 made a lower low in real terms, not in nominal terms since inflation was so high). 1975 was a crazy bounce down, and 1982 saw a lower low in real terms even though many of the problems had been solved for corporations in the previous 7 years. I think we will find a similar proposition in 2020-ish. So even though both real and nominal earnings will be much higher in 2020 vs. 2009, probably somewhere in the $70-$80 range like I mention in the post, it will get a multiple of about 7 at the bottom, due in large part to the business cycle and the profit margin cycle, return of fear, etc. I am thinking a new bottom at 550-600, not much lower than 2009.

That is my '10-point' summary of the entire previous post.

So the upshot is that I don't disagree with you at all! Not a little bit. You called the bottom based on valuation, and I completely agree with your call. But I think there are cycle dynamics at play especially with commodites and profit margins that will push valuations lower than the 2009 low, and even though earnings will be better (which stands by your valuation bottom argument) price will get beaten down.

That is my take, and I completely respect if you don't agree with it. Just letting you know why I have my stance.

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#13) On March 09, 2011 at 11:59 AM, checklist34 (99.71) wrote:

I failed again.  Whats going on here?  I post my reply but it won't show. 

Anyway, here is my reply:

http://caps.fool.com/Blogs/a-reply-to-binves-post-about/553758#commentsForm

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#14) On March 09, 2011 at 12:49 PM, checklist34 (99.71) wrote:

Binve, to your #12:

1.  ok, I guess thats the basic jist of my argument that stocks were cheap

2.  I guess I don't quite grasp the need for rolling 10 year pes.  But going with it.. remember my point about accounting in the link I put in 13 above and...  if the S&P earns say 80 or 90 over this decade ... be unprecedented to get back to 670 on a rolling 10 year basis, no?  I have never calculated, so i'm asking.

3.  Isn't that an argument against a new low?

4.  ok, granted.  But in the absence of a labor market in which companies have to actively compete, and with the presence of so much productive slack, they don't have to come down quickly this time.  They will revert, though, no arguing that but i'm not sure it has to happen quickly... although massive commodity prices could sure make it happen.

5.  ok, this is a good point, margins are likely to come down by 2020.  We began the 2010's with about 80 bucks of earnings (remember to adjust for accounting differences)...  has there ever been a decade where the S&P earnings were flat with the first years, on average?  I don't know that there hasn't, I'm just asking.  

no argument 6-9

10.  i basically agree.  except I don't agree that a better buying opportunity will presentitself at whatever the last bottom of this secular bear is than was presented in late 2008/early 2009.  "cheaper" by some statistics, perhaps, but not nearly the opportunity.  

OK, we're in agreement, except for my generally bullish nature, and your generally bearish.  Odd, that.

I humbly submit that if this is the 70s redux...  the last crash will fall to a level FAR above the level at the mega-panic-bottom.  To maybe 11-1200.  

Low 60s in 1974...  low 100's in 1982.  

High 600s in 2009, ...  1100 in 2017?

There is no historical precedent for getting even close to 670 again.  

On everything else I have no trouble conceding or agreeing.  

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#15) On March 09, 2011 at 1:15 PM, binve (< 20) wrote:

checklist,

I am glad that we are mostly in agreement! However, I still have to challenge your 74/82 observation: http://caps.fool.com/Blogs/rebuttal-to-checklist-/553818

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