Hang Lung was founded in 1949, and entered the Hong Kong real estate development market in 1960. They build and rent residential and office buildings, car parks, and luxury shopping malls. Twenty years ago, they began to expand from Hong Kong into mainland China. They began building shopping malls and associated residential and office buildings in the major cities in south-east China, beginning in Shanghai. They build world-class buildings and keep them up-to-date with renovations and improvements. Since a picture is worth a 1,000 words, google "Plaza 66 in Shanghai", and go to images. They have eight projects like Plaza 66 in China now, with the last one or two not yet profitable. It normally takes four or five years to get to acceptable profitability, that is, to get to full occupancy with the right mix of tenants.

They made a fortune by purchasing developable land in Hong Kong on the cheap during the 1997-2002 Asian Financial Crisis. Over time, they have been selling off their Hong Kong developments when the local market is high and they can get a very good price. Their revenue today is about half from Hong Kong and half from China. Their revenue in RMB is exposed to the exchange rate fluctuations, but Chinese profits are normally kept in China to pay for future construction. Their current plans are to greatly expand their mainland China portfolio of properties, based on their fundamental belief that the past two decades of fast wealth accumulation in China will inevitably lead to a similar increase in personal consumption.

From year to year, their earnings are lumpy, as normal rental income is occasionally enhanced by opportunities to sell properties for a large profit. They take a long-term view of the real estate market, and they are willing to sit tight for years if market conditions are unfavorable. They do not want to overpay, and do not want to sell cheap.

While their new developments have gone pretty much as planned, they also have been impacted by the slowdown of Chinese growth that began in 2011. For about six years (a rather long time), the Chinese retail economy faced difficulties from government anti-corruption and anti-opulence campaigns, years of loose monetary policy leading to overcapacity in production and inventories, diminishing export growth, an oversupply of store spaces, an over-expansion of luxury fashion brand outlets, and continuing expansion of international and internet purchasing vs. local brick & mortar stores. Finally, in mid-2017, economic conditions began to improve as inventories were worked down, excess production capacity closed, projects were deleveraged, and credit was reallocated to more productive investments. In short, financial results began to improve.

Their June 30, 2017 financials show approx.:
$ 1.65 billion in annualized revenue (2 x 6 months)
$ 996 million in annualized profit
$ 2.9 billion in cash
$ 3.1 billion in debt
$ 16.9 billion in shareholder equity
$ 11.6 billion in retained earnings
$ 0.97 total of last four dividends

*All values quoted are in US Dollars, and were calculated using 0.13 USD to 1.00 Hong Kong Dollar.

There are 4.5 billion common shares and each US ADR represents five shares. Few shares are in the US, maybe 10%. The vast majority of shares trade on the Hong Kong exchange, as Hang Lung Properties Ltd (0101.HK). As a Sponsored Level 1 ADR, HIPPY has a share deposit agreement with Bank of New York Mellon, is exempt from full SEC reporting requirements, and can only be traded on the OTC market. I would seriously doubt that they ever have any interest in uplisting in the US, as they would have little patience dealing with activist investors looking for a quick profit, plus it would be a lot of extra work with little benefit in their situation. I also would not recommend buying any stock where the company was not fully reporting to the SEC, so this pitch is only for CAPS.

On a side note, they have 4,584 employees, 73% of which are in mainland China. Their average cost per employee, which I understand to contain salary, bonuses, benefits and training, calculates out to $38,512 annually. I don't know how skewed their numbers are toward upper management, but find it an interesting data point.